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T he long-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the develop-ment of the world’s cities is not yet known. But as with previous outbreaks of disease throughout history, it will be felt in the ways 
infrastructure and urban planners adapt to the spread of the disease. Just 
as the cholera outbreaks of the 19th century accelerated moves to sewerage 
systems and new sanitation infrastructure and practices in cities, so the leg-
acy of this 21st century pandemic will reshape urban form. Already we are 
seeing varied responses: in some cities transportation is being remodelled 
by the rapid implementation of new cycling networks; in others existing 
agendas are being brought forward, such as Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo’s 
“15-minute city”, where all the goods and services people need are placed 
within walking distance of their homes; urban greening trends have 
accelerated (e.g. Boston’s “Big Dig”); existing shifts towards surveillance 
technologies and the use of big data in cities have been extended; central 
business districts have emptied in response to needs to physically distance 
(placing question marks over their viability in the long term); and new local 
community solidarity initiatives have emerged in response to the collective 
challenges the pandemic poses (Safi, 2020). 
But cities were already in the throes of decades-long transformations of 
a profound nature before the virus struck. Although clearly an important 
shaping force on society, COVID-19 will not transform cities permanently 
on its own. Instead, its short-term effects will interact with deep-lying struc-
tural transformative trends that are already playing themselves out in our 
cities, and in the wider international system in which cities are embedded. 
It will accelerate some of those trends and retard others. The future of cities 
will be made in the intersections of these trends, and by political actors that 
can successfully bend long-term trends and short-term crises towards the 
realisation of their own visions. 
We might see the emergence of COVID-19 and its rapid transmission 
around the world as offering an inflection point: drawing together multiple 
strands in politics, society, economics, ecology and technology; laying bare 
previously overlooked connections and conjunctures; offering a vantage 
point from which to reflect on broader historical movements and shifts. The 
advent of the virus has also acted as a catalyst: accelerating some develop-
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ments in cities that were already visible before the pandemic struck, such 
as the implementation of digital technologies in the creation of “smart 
cities”, the emerging tensions between major cities and the states in which 
they are embedded, and prompting reflection on how to make cities more 
socially just and environmentally sustainable. 
At the same time, cities, states and societies have all had to adapt and 
change in relation to the specific challenges the virus presents. COVID-19 
has paused the frenetic onward surge of urban life and given a chance 
to reflect on broad trends. But while the virus alone is not enough to fully 
recast the shape and direction of cities, it may be woven through and 
entwined with these trends, with its influence making certain futures more 
probable and others less so. The future of global cities, their interplay and 
engagement with other powerful entities like states and international 
organisations and broader geo-political, geo-economic and ecological forc-
es already posed pressing and open questions before the pandemic hit. 
In this short discussion of these major transformative trends I make 
use of the concept of the “global city” to denote a historically specific 
urban form: a form that may be subject to transformation. The sociol-
ogist Saskia Sassen (1991) introduced this concept to the discussion 
on urban change to describe a distinctive form of city whose features, 
morphology and webs of global connectivity emerged in the late-1970s 
in response to the restructuring of the global economy following the 
collapse of the post-World War II Bretton Woods system. Global cities 
are urban forms that are intrinsically and inseparably linked to the spe-
cific era of globalisation that followed from this economic restructuring. 
Global cities were a product of the regulatory environment created at 
this time (with its emphasis on free market exchange, privatisation, 
deregulation and financialisation) and were shaped by the global flows 
of deregulated capital that it set loose. They became its material expres-
sion (in the generation of new urban forms and infrastructures) and 
came to shape the development and direction of globalisation itself. 
But in these origins lies a further crucial point that is often missed by 
many urban theorists. The global city has been made possible by a 
particular configuration of geopolitics. Global cities are the product of 
a historically specific form of liberal world order, underpinned by a his-
torically specific configuration of geopolitical power (Ikenberry, 2011). 
Under the hegemony of the United States, a liberal, open trading order 
has been fostered over the past four decades, underwritten by US 
military power in the last resort, but providing a secure and stable envi-
ronment in which cities could begin to play important roles on the world 
stage, firstly as economic actors and sites of economic power and, more 
recently, as political players (Curtis, 2016). It is only in this stable global 
environment that cities, long stripped of their military or defensive capa-
bilities, could begin to find their niche and to evolve. 
Now this environment seems to be under threat from a number of differ-
ent sources. Losing the protection it afforded is likely to have profound 
consequences for the viability of “global cities” as such. The US hege-
mony that underpins the system has been perceived to be in decline for 
a decade, while other powers like China have risen, shifting the locus of 
economic power to the east. But the advent of the Trump administration 
and its inward-looking nativist policies has further exacerbated this per-
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ception of decline, decay and abdication of international leadership. The 
rising prominence of authoritarian states on the world stage, from China 
to Iran, Russia, Turkey and Brazil, lends further weight to the idea that the 
liberal moment is passing, as do the increasing prevalence of right-wing 
movements across the world. Threats to the future of the European Union 
also push in this direction – none more so than Britain’s decision to leave. 
But the most important challenge to this configuration of world order is 
the unresolved 2008 financial crisis, which swept away not only decades 
of growth, but also the ideological legitimacy of neoliberal capitalism  – the 
very form of global economic organisation from which global cities drew 
their lifeblood. All of these are morbid symptoms of a system under great 
strain. Even before the disaster of COVID-19 was inserted into this toxic 
mixture, the future of global cities, if we mean the specific form of city that 
thrived in this now decaying environment, was under threat. The pandemic 
further threatens to accelerate a decline in what is an open form of global 
order, offering the prospect of  borders, barriers and walls of various kinds 
closing down the free movement of global flows.
However, even when such existential threats are real, the very fact of the 
existence of global cities – novel urban forms not seen before in the histor-
ical record – has opened up new possibilities in the international system. 
Global cities have original features, new capacities and capabilities and 
a new weight on the world stage that have altered the nature of world 
politics and global governance and offer novel possibilities, pathways and 
futures for the evolution of international society. And this is necessary, 
because in a world of transnational challenges, including global pandemics, 
but also the climate emergency and the crises of global capitalism, cities’ 
capacities to help with global challenges via their globe-spanning networks, 
leadership and agenda-setting capabilities, are going to be necessary. This 
is a world in which states have struggled to deal with such challenges. 
That makes cities acting together on the world stage a critical governance 
resource – and one that needs to be better understood and defended.
In the space of this short essay I want to examine the intersection of three 
dimensions of the transformation of cities before concluding with some 
thoughts on what is at stake in the future evolution of global cities in a 
post-pandemic world. These dimensions are: globalisation, global gover-
nance and geopolitics. 
I. Globalisation 
Globalisation produced global cities. But it has become apparent in the last 
decade or so that globalisation has brought many problems in its wake and 
that its future is unclear. Because global cities are products of the forces 
that unleashed contemporary globalisation, especially in their reliance on 
deregulated markets and global capital flows, they also exhibit, in their 
very morphology and form, many of the tensions and contradictions of 
globalisation (Curtis, 2019a). They become strategic sites where the more 
abstract forces underpinning globalism reveal themselves in concrete form. 
They focus and amplify systemic tensions. We have seen this in the way 
social movements protesting globalisation choose global cities as their sites 
of protest and resistance – the anti-globalisation protests of the 1990s and 
early 2000s, and the Occupy movements of the post-2008 financial crisis 
and austerity decade, for example. 
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They also demonstrate these tensions in their very materiality: in the co-ex-
istence of poverty and great wealth within the same neighbourhoods, 
or in the sprawling slums and informal settlements of developing world 
cities, such as Sao Paulo or Delhi, which nestle close by the gated commu-
nities of the super-rich (Davis, 2006; Graham, 2016). Global expressions 
of the “right to the city” movement have come into being, as urban 
citizens everywhere protest against the ways the inequalities of free mar-
ket, finance capital-led globalisation have been materialised in cities, and 
demand more democratic control over how urban space is allocated and 
used (Harvey, 2012). 
But it is not just the left that has problems with the orientation of global-
isation.  Now, with years of austerity beginning to bite, global cities, with 
their cosmopolitan and open orientation, with their diverse populations 
and multiple forms of identity, culture and belonging, have started to 
come into conflict with the rise of nationalist and nativist feeling brought 
by globalisation’s attendant uncertainties and destabilisation of tradition. 
A divide has begun to emerge between global cities and the heartlands 
of the territorial nation-states in which they formed. We have seen this in 
voting patterns around Brexit and the election of US President Trump: a 
clear preference in metropolitan areas for remain in the case of Brexit, and 
for Democrat in the case of the US election in 2016. We have seen it in the 
tensions between the Trump administration and US cities over Sanctuary 
Cities and the rights and protections they afford migrants. We have seen it 
in disagreements over the implementation of the Paris Agreement (Trump 
repudiates it, while global city mayors say they will implement it). Recently, 
we have seen it in debates about law and order in liberal US cities in the 
wake of the Black Lives Matter protests. 
Can this divide be healed, or will it continue to drive a wedge between 
global cities and the nation-states in which they are historically embed-
ded? This becomes a hugely significant question for the post-pandemic 
future, because global cities have begun to exhibit many new capabil-
ities and new forms of agency and power as they have evolved over 
the last four decades of globalisation. These capabilities and forms of 
agency and power may be particularly significant in a future in which 
many transnational problems (themselves unleashed by globalisation) 
are proving beyond the capacities of states to deal with, largely because 
of structural limitations built into an international system based on ter-
ritorial sovereignty. The question is: will they be fostered, or will they be 
crushed by the return of the state and the rise of nativist politics?
II. Global governance
Global cities first emerged as a functional requirement of a new form of 
global economy. But many powerful cities are now moving to translate 
their economic power into political influence on the world stage.
As the state drew back from allocating society’s productive resourc-
es in response to the new neoliberal paradigm, these decisions were 
transferred into the hands of private actors: major firms or emerging 
transnational corporations who located themselves within the central 
business districts of global cities such as London, New York and Hong 
Kong. This spurred the natural agglomeration economies that cities have 
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always fostered; kickstarting decades of astonishing growth for these 
key locales. Such cities drew upon their historical advantages – and the 
new regulatory environment – to draw in wealth and concentrate power.
But now these cities have begun to seek power beyond the economic 
sphere. The primary mechanism for exercising new political powers has 
been unexpected, perhaps, but also fully in line with the ways global cities 
have evolved economically – via globe-spanning networks, connected by 
digital information technology infrastructures. There has been a surge in 
the growth of functional political networks connecting cities around the 
world. Today there are between 250–300 organised associations of cities 
globally – the vast majority of which have been formed in the last three 
decades – covering issues such as climate, security, health, resilience and 
many others (Acuto, 2016; Fernández de Losada, 2019). Such transnation-
al municipal networks (TMNs) are conduits for cities to exert influence on 
global agendas, development goals and international norms (including the 
evolution of international law) (Blank, 2006). They offer new forms of gov-
ernance that act in parallel to that pursued by traditional state diplomacy, 
giving cities a new presence among the constellation of global governance 
actors, helping both to shape and implement the agenda of the United 
Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals, the New Urban Agenda and the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, for example. 
But, more than this, some of the most powerful TMNs have even begun 
to develop their own agendas, regardless of the direction of states. The 
C40, for example, a group of almost 100 of the world’s most powerful cit-
ies, embraced a “global green new deal” agenda in 2019, committing its 
members to develop policies to achieve the Paris climate goals of limiting 
global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and halving emissions 
by 2030 (Curtis, 2019b). Such decisions are far from negligible: C40 mem-
bers encompass a twelfth of the world’s population, their economic power 
represents a quarter of the global economy, and they are the key strategic 
sites in which the climate emergency will have to be tackled. 
The emergence of this kind of activity is hugely significant because it rep-
resents a new form of agency and governance capacity within international 
society: a new form of diversity in a system long the preserve of state actors. 
Cities and their leadership are able to exercise a new form of power on the 
world stage: the ability to convene networks of various actors, including 
the expertise of private firms, to amplify the voices of social movements 
and to direct the capacities and abilities of those networks towards certain 
governance goals. Additionally, many cities offer a form of legitimate repre-
sentative agency, with mayors having been democratically elected by sizable 
populations. Such developments offer the prospect of real influence on 
global governance agendas and outcomes in the years to come. 
However, the question arises once more: how will states accommodate 
the rise of this new form of agency? Will they embrace the novel gover-
nance capacities emerging within cities and work with cities to empower 
them to help solve global governance challenges such as climate change 
and health issues? This would enable international society to move 
beyond the roadblocks and impasses built into its structure, where com-
petitive state sovereignty has led to the repeated failure to deal with 
these challenges. Or will states seek to supress these emerging forms of 
agency and city diplomatic activity? Already we see signs of this – in the 
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clashes between US cities and the Trump administration mentioned ear-
lier and in moves by Russia to resist the encroachment of city activities 
onto the territory of state sovereignty (Acuto, 2017).
III. Geopolitics
Indeed, the pandemic has accelerated recent trends towards the return 
of the state. States have had to step in to underwrite economies in ways 
that exceed even the 2008 financial crisis, using their sovereign power 
to keep stalled societies afloat and roll out national health responses. 
Everywhere the neoliberal illusion of the small state is beginning to be 
burned away by the harsh light of the pandemic. The return of the state 
to the centre of economic decision-making joins the trends towards 
populist nationalism and authoritarian states that were already gaining 
momentum. The international environment is quickly shifting, and the 
climate that made liberal globalisation and the global city possible is 
beginning to darken. The emerging forms of multi-stakeholder global 
governance described above may not be able to survive in a less hospita-
ble climate, as the liberal world order begins to decay. 
The decline of US hegemony has been mirrored by the rise of Chinese 
power and influence in the last decade. As China exerts more influence 
and seeks to reshape the nature of international society, we should 
expect this to be reflected in the nature of urban space. Just as global 
cities are a reflection of, and intrinsically connected to, US liberal hege-
mony, so the very different values China espouses will materialise in 
the tight connection between geopolitics and urbanisation. Since 2013 
China has been engaged in a vast project of infrastructure construction 
and urban development across Afro-Eurasia, both within and beyond its 
borders. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as this multi-faceted policy 
is named, is nothing less than an attempt to instantiate a Chinese-led 
form of globalisation. Drawing, so far, around 70 countries into its orbit 
of influence, the BRI incorporates twothirds of the world’s population, 
has a projected $1.5 trillion price-tag, and incorporates six land and 
maritime economic corridors (Maçães, 2018). Belt and Road cities have 
yet to find their form, but the early signs are that they will be shaped 
by a number of trends drawn from Chinese developmental models: 
emphasising the spatial form of the transnational economic corridor and 
smart surveillance technologies applied to cities, as seen in Shenzhen, 
Hangzhou and Shanghai within China, and beyond in the models of 
Bonifacio Global City, Manila and the “smart city” of Astana (Curtis and 
Mayer, 2020).
Such cities and urban corridors will likely eventually project political and 
economic principles and preferences that are very different to the open, 
liberal trading order in which global cities have thrived. Indeed, the cur-
rent travails of Hong Kong are emblematic of the fault lines where two 
possible world orders grind against each other: the open, networked 
trading city of recent decades and the emerging Belt and Road system 
of tomorrow. 
China’s relative success in suppressing COVID-19 – especially through 
the application of smart surveillance technologies – as more open 
societies in the West struggled, may mean its urban model appeals 
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to developing countries seeking an alternative to the liberal model. It 
should also be noted that Chinese cities are active participants in many 
transnational municipal networks (Mierzeijewski, 2020). The possibility 
remains that, as Chinese-inflected forms of urbanism evolve, China may 
use these conduits to diffuse its own experiences, urban developmental 
models and technological forms back through the networks. The eventu-
al fate of global cities, and the networks they have begun to form, may 
eventually come to look quite different to the picture we have today. 
IV. Post-pandemic futures
The inter-connected future of the international system and of cities is at 
a crossroads. This was the case even before COVID-19; but the pandemic 
has opened a window on these dynamics, even as it influences them in 
various ways. 
What possible futures are emerging at this juncture? They are multiple 
and complex, but as a useful simplifying sketch two distinct pathways 
are appearing along two contrasting political fault-lines. 
The first is a choice between greater state control over cities and continued 
autonomy and independence for cities and their transnational networks. 
As we have seen, certain states find the devolved model cities have carved 
out for themselves in world affairs hard to accept, as well as their increas-
ing economic and political weight, and may seek to rein this trend in. But, 
at the same time, global cities have begun to offer a new capacity for 
governing global challenges – something the world needs given states’ 
failures on issues such as the climate emergency. At the same time, many 
global cities also have a level of democratic legitimacy that challenges the 
sovereign prerogatives of states: many urban citizens are beginning to 
invest their identity and loyalty in the city and its leadership. Not only do 
such cities often have vast and diverse populations that fit uneasily within 
the nation-state framework, they also offer a unique form of multi-scalar 
local-to-global reach missing in moribund national politics today. This is 
very visible in the current pandemic, where top-down statist responses 
that marginalise local expertise and knowledge, such as in Britain, have 
performed poorly. Perhaps a useful middle way would be a renewed part-
nership between states and cities where states recognise the capacities and 
capabilities of cities and their globe-spanning networks as a resource and 
collaborate to empower them to meet global challenges. 
The second choice of path emerges from the increasingly strident calls 
for greater social justice, equity and ecological sensitivity embodied 
under the “right to the city” that oppose the defence and intensification 
of the neoliberal hyper-financialised form of the global city, with its vast 
wealth disparities and contrasts in life experiences. Even before the pan-
demic this contrast was increasingly on the political agenda, exacerbated 
by over a decade of austerity policies and held in place by an increasingly 
authoritarian form of neoliberal capitalism, augmented by trends such 
as surveillance technologies and the secession of urban elites into gated 
communities and fortified spaces. The pandemic has merely clarified 
this picture: those with wealth and private resources have retreated into 
well-connected home offices, while those without have been left to cope 
as best they can.
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The post-pandemic future for global cities faces two forks in the road. 
The first is a choice between a cosmopolitan, interconnected internation-
alism and an international system of renewed state control. The second is 
between an increasingly crisis-wracked form of capitalist city and moves to 
build alternative urban forms with greater balance, social justice and equity. 
The pandemic will not transform cities by itself: it offers a political opportu-
nity that groups with different visions of future cities are trying to grasp. 
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